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Abstract—To secure transmissions in the presence of a pas-
sive eavesdropper whose Channel State Information (CSI) is
unknown, classical Physical Layer Security (PLS) uses Artificial
Noise (AN) in order to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel. This
paper suggests an alternative way of achieving confidentiality
which is based on Base Station (BS) cooperation on the downlink
as supported in 3GPP LTE-advanced and future 5G networks.
Each BS sends a sequence to the legitimate receiver who is able
to reconstruct the information message by XoR-ing the received
sequences. As long as the eavesdropper(s) is not at the same
location as the legitimate receiver, there is a likelihood that one
of the links will not be of high quality and, as such, she will
not be able to acquire all sequences required for decoding the
message. The proposed scheme has low complexity at the receiver
and can be used in systems with finite-alphabet input, whereby
most Artificial-Noise (AN) based schemes are ineffective.
Index Terms—physical layer security, wiretap coding, base sta-
tion cooperation, quasi-static Rayleigh channel, reverse training,
maximal-ratio transmit beamforming.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Introduction to PLS
Physical Layer Security (PLS) is a potential realisation
of Information Theoretical security which is considered the
strictest notion of security. Information Theoretical security is
not a new concept; It was introduced by Shannon in 1949
[13] and was revisited by Wyner in 1975 [14] who was the
first to see that noise and imperfections in the physical link
can be exploited in order to ‘hide’ information without the
need of keys. The main advantages of PLS is that it makes no
assumptions on the computational power of the adversary and
that its performance can be quantified precisely.
The secrecy coding that PLS uses for confidentiality is
called wiretap coding. The most popular codes for secrecy
purposes are the low-density-parity-check codes, polar codes,
and lattice codes [6]. Randomisation among multiple code-
words is the key property of wiretap coding and the main
difference from the error correcting codes that solely aim for
reliability. The randomisation is added in order to confuse the
eavesdropper, thereby achieving confidentiality. The redundant
bits that aim to confuse the eavesdropper are called the equiv-
ocation bits. Notation RE and RB refer to the equivocation
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rate and transmission rate, respectively, and they are measured
in bits per second (bps).
Let CB be the channel capacity of the legitimate channel
and let CE be the channel capacity of the wiretap channel:
the channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper. The
difference CB − CE is known as the secrecy gap and secure
transmission via wiretap coding is possible if and only if the
secrecy gap is strictly positive. When the transmitter has per-
fect knowledge of both CB and CE < CB , a wiretap code is
determined by the doublet (RB , RE) such that RB ≤ CB and
RE > CE . The difference RS := RB−RE defines the secrecy
rate and expresses how many bits can be sent both reliably
and securely per second. The maximum achievable secrecy
rate, denoted by CS , is equal to CS := max(0, CB − CE).
For many years after Wyner’s paper [14], the security com-
munity doubted the practicality of PLS due to the restrictive
requirement of a strictly positive secrecy gap [11] and the
industry had little or no interest in PLS. In the last decade, PLS
regained attention. Advancements in wireless technologies
such as the employment of multiple-antenna systems can be
used in a way that the secrecy gap is increased. The quality of
the legitimate channel can be increased by exploiting spatial
diversities and mutliplexing gains, whereas the generation of
artificial noise can degrade the eavesdropper’s channel without
effecting the legitimate receiver to the same degree.
The use of artificial noise was introduced by Goel and Negi
in 2005 [10] and many AN-based schemes followed since.
Most AN-based schemes are often based on the assumption of
Gaussian-input signalling and they are not effective in current
transmission schemes such as phase shift keying and quadra-
ture amplitude modulation. Some works on AN generation
that consider finite inputs exist but they require knowledge
of the eavesdropper’s CSI. A detailed overview on AN-based
schemes that examines theoretical and practical limitations can
be found in [3].
B. Inspiration and Our Approach
The scheme aims to provide a positive secrecy gap by
degrading the eavesdropper’s channel without the use of AN
and therefore be applicable in communication systems with
discrete-alphabet inputs. We show that the employment of
multiple BSs along with an encoding scheme: secret splitting
can significantly increase the probability of a positive secrecy
gap and allow secure transmissions.
The main idea of the scheme, secret splitting (also known
as secret sharing), has its origins in network coding whereby
the confidential message is split into M ‘splits’ and are sent to
the legitimate receiver through different paths. In Capar’s work
[1], [2], a large network of trusted relay nodes is considered
and the splits (or shares) travel through parallel paths after ap-
propriate relaying in a multi-hop networks. Loosely speaking,
by parallel paths it is meant that the transmission links do not
cross at any other location but only at the legitimate receiver.
As such, the eavesdropper(s) will not acquire all ‘splits’ and
will fail to decode the message.
Motivated by recent advancements in distributed massive-
MIMO and BS corporation, the work examines secret splitting
under links created solely in the physical layer. In contrast
to secret splitting in network coding, we do not examine
the choice of paths/routes for which secrecy is guaranteed.
Communications happen in a one-hop manner, the number
of BSs is fixed as well as their location. As such, the paths
may not be parallel in the sense that the secret splits may
travel via beams that overlap. Lastly, our analysis revolves
around a single realisation of the fading channel coefficients,
and as such it takes no advantage of the fading properties of
the channel [5].
C. Organisation
Section II defines and explains secret splitting and secrecy
gap under secret splitting. In Section III, the probability of a
positive secrecy gap is derived and analysed under a specific
channel setting and transmission scheme. A comparison be-
tween conventional wiretap coding and secret splitting follows
in Section IV and numerical results are presented. The paper
concludes with a discussion and future directions in Section
V.
D. Notation
Throughout this paper, bold capital letters denote matrices
and bold lower case letters denote vectors. The all zero/unit
matrix of size N ×N is denoted by 0N /IN . Notation i ∈ [M ]
means that variable i is an element of the set {1, 2, . . . ,M}. To
indicate that x/x is a standard complex random variable/vector,
we write x ∼ CN (0, 1) / x ∼ CN (0, I). Expression x ∼
Γ(k, θ) indicates that random variable x follows the Gamma
distribution with shape parameter k and scale parameter θ.
The upper upper/lower incomplete gamma function is denoted
by Γinc(·, ·)/γinc(·, ·). The argument of a complex number is
denoted by | · |, whereas || · || is used for the Frobenius norm.
Lastly, function H(·) is Shannon’s entropy, I(·; ·) is the mutual
information of two variables, and all logarithmic functions are
to base two.
II. SECRECY GAP UNDER SECRET SPLITTING
A. Secret Splitting
Let w denote the confidential binary message of length k
that Alice wishes to send to Bob in the presence of an eaves-
dropper, Eve. Alice is able to control M base stations, namely
A1, A2, . . . , AM . Alternatively, Ai can also be considered to
be a relay node with which Alice can communicate through a
secure network.
The transmitter generates M−1 uniform independent binary
sequences of length k, namely, w1, . . . ,wM−1. An M
th






We call {wi, i ∈ [M ]} the secret splits of w. Secret split
wi is sent to Bob through base station Ai. After collecting
all M secret splits, Bob XoRs the sequences and attains
the confidential message. Indeed, it is evident from (1) that
⊕M
i=1 wi = w.
Note that the confidential message w may not have a
uniform distribution, e.g. it may correspond to an English word
or to a user’s predictable password. However, when random
sequence
⊕M−1
i=1 wi is XoRed to w, the resulting split, wM ,
is also random and independent of w. Secret splitting can also
be thought as a one-time pad encryption [13] with
⊕M−1
i=1 wi
being the secret key and wM being the codeword.
Theorem 1. As long as the eavesdropper attains less than M
secret splits, she gains no information about the confidential
message w:
I(w;Ws) = 0 for all Ws ⊂ {wi, i ∈ [M ]}. (2)
In Information Theoretical terms, when Eq. (2) is satisfied,
strong secrecy is achieved which guarantees zero information
leakage regardless the length, k, of the message. That is, it
only takes one weak link between the eavesdropper and a base
station in order to achieve confidentiality.
B. Secrecy Gap
With appropriate wiretap coding, secret split wi can be
securely transmitted as long as CBi − CEi > 0. As Th. 1
implies, the secure transmission of one secret split is sufficient
for securing message w. Thus, for secrecy purposes, it is
required that CBi − CEi > 0 for some i ∈ [M ]. The latter
is equivalent to requiring maxi∈[M ](CBi − CEi) > 0 which
motivates the following definition.




(CBi − CEi) (3)
When the secrecy gap SGsplit is positive with probability
equal to one or zero, secure communication is possible, or not
possible, respectively. When the channels are not deterministic
but random processes, quantity P (SGsplit > 0) can take any
value in the interval [0, 1]. The next section studies the prob-
ability of a positive secrecy gap under Quasi-Static Rayleigh
channel and transmit beamforming.
III. SECRECY GAP IN QUASI-STATIC RAYLEIGH
CHANNELS
A. Channel Model
In our channel model, the legitimate receiver is a single-
antenna device, whereas the adversary and transmitter may
have multiple antennas. We denote by NE and NA the number
of antennas at Eve and Ai, respectively. The base stations have
the same number of antennas (NA) for simplicity.
Vector hi = (h
(i)
1 , . . . h
(i)
NA
) ∈ C1×NA , i ∈ [M ] comprises
the channel coefficients h
(i)
j of the channel between the j
th
antenna of Ai and Bob. The matrix Gi = (g
(i)




CNE×NA indicates the channel between Eve and base station
Ai. Column g
(i)
j is the channel vector between base station
Ai and the j
th antenna at Eve. All channels are assumed to be
reciprocal, i.e., communication takes place in a time-division-
duplex manner.
Bob’s and Eve’s channels are independent and drawn from
a Rayleigh distribution:










for all i ∈ [M ] and j ∈ [NE ].
When base station Ai transmits x ∈ C
NA×1, the received
signal at Bob and Eve are given by
y = hix+ n
(i)







E denote additive white
Gaussian noise of zero mean and unit variance/covariance-
matrix that vary independently for different i ∈ [M ] and from
the transmission of one symbol to the other:
n
(i)
B ∼ CN (0, 1) and n
(i)
E ∼ CN (0NE , INE ). (6)
B. Transmission scheme
1) Wiretap Coding and modulation: With Bob being a
single-antenna node, the base stations transmit the secret splits
successively. Before transmission, reliability and equivocation
bits may be added to each one of the secret splits resulting
in longer binary words. Modulation such as QAM or PSK
modulation maps the binary words to a sequence of signals
ready for transmission through the medium.
For example, after wiretap coding, secret split w1 is trans-
mitted as s1 = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ C
1×n for some n ∈ N. Note
that the length n may differ at other BSs depending on the
wiretap coding and modulation scheme used. Without loss for
generality, the signal power is normalised to one: E(|sj |
2) = 1.
2) Transmit beamforming: Transmit beamforming is pre-
ferred for secrecy purposes since it avoids CSI leakage at the
eavesdropper [7]–[9]. Being unaware of her own channel, the
eavesdropper is unable to increase her decoding capabilities,
e.g. by performing receive-beamforming. No CSI of the wire-
tap channel is available at Alice, either. For example, this is
the case when the eavesdropper is passive and remains silent.
Under this scenario, the best transmit beamforming strategy
for secrecy purposes is Maximal-Ratio-Transmit (MRT) beam-
forming [4, Corr. 2]; With MRT the signal is sent towards the
channel direction of the legitimate receiver and, as such, his
SNR is maximised.
With the channel remaining static throughout the transmis-
sion of a secret split, the MRT beamforming vector hH1 /||h1||
is applied to every symbol of si = (s1, . . . , sn). To avoid a






substitution in (5) shows that the received signals at Bob and
Eve are












C. Probability of positive secrecy gap
Given the unit variance receiver-noise and the normalised
to unit power signal, the average SNRs for sequence si at the
two receivers are given by
γBi = ||hi||





Theorem 2. Distribution of SNR at two receivers
1) Variable γBi follows the Gamma distribution with shape








2) Variable γEi is independent of γBi and follows the
gamma distribution with shape parameter NEi and scale
parameter σ2Ei :








and ¯γEi = NEσ
2
Ei. (13)
Observe that Bob’s average SNR is a linear function of NA
whilst Eve’s average SNR is a linear function of NE . Only
Bob benefits from an increase in the number of antennas at
Alice.
Theorem 3. The probability of positive secrecy gap under
secret splitting is




P (γEi ≥ γBi) . (14)
Theorem 4. The probability of positive secrecy gap under
secret splitting, MRT, and independent Rayleigh channels is
equal to:




























(a) M = 1, NA = 1, NE = 2 (b) M = 3, NA = 1, NE = 2
Fig. 1: The red colour indicates areas at which a 2-antenna
adversary node has a better signal than Bob with high proba-
bility. The blue colour indicates the opposite.
Note that the integration in Eq. (4) is with respect to γBi.
As such, the probability of P (SGsplit > 0) is a function of the
channel statistics, σ2Bi and σ
2
Ei, and the number of antennas,
NA and NE .
Corollary 4.1. When Eve is a single antenna node (NE = 1),
Eq. (15) can be expressed as










From a user’s location point of view, by invoking the
relationship between average signal power and distance [12],
the channel statistics can be expressed as
σ2Bi = k/d(Ai, B)
α and σ2Ei = k/d(Ai, E)
α, (17)
for some k ∈ R, where d(Ai, B)/d(Ai, E) is the distance
between Ai and Bob/Eve and α is the path-loss exponent. For
example, Eq. (16) is equivalent to











Although the probability of a positive secrecy gap is a
function of the path-loss exponent α, the differences in the
graphs for different values of α ∈ [3, 5] were hardly noticeable.
All numerical results of this paper consider the case when
α = 4 only.
In Figure 1a the red area indicates the locations at which
the eavesdropper has an advantage over Bob. i.e., locations
at which the probability of a positive gap is low. When
three single-antenna BSs (or relay nodes) are employed, the
likelihood that Eve attains a better signal than Bob is decreased
dramatically (Fig. 1b).
D. Asymptotic behaviour
It is evident from Th. 3 that the probability of positive
secrecy gap is an increasing function of the number of base-
stations, M ; If Eve is equipped with a finite number of
antennas then it is a strictly increasing function. In the latter
(a) Probability of positive SGsplit as an increasing function
of NA.
(b) Probability of non-positive SGsplit as an increasing
function of NA.
Fig. 2: Probability of positive/negative SGsplit against NA/NE
when two BSs are employed (M = 2) and Eve is at the middle
between Bob and A1. Solid lines/scattered plots are derived
theoretically/empirically.
case, when M becomes asymptotically large, the secrecy gap
under secret splitting is positive with probability one:
lim
M→∞
P (SGsplit > 0) = 1. (19)
On the other hand, for a fixed number BSs, M , secure
communication is not possible when NE → ∞. Indeed, with
an asymptotically large number of antennas available at Eve
only, she always experiences a better SNR than Bob. Since
P (γEi ≥ γB) = 1 for all i ∈ [M ], it follows that
lim
NE→∞
P (SGsplit ≤ 0) = 1. (20)
Consider the metrics P (SGsplit > 0) and P (SGsplit ≤ 0),
i.e., the probability of Bob being successful and Eve successful
in terms of achieving a better signal, respectively. For the
setting as illustrated in Fig. 2a whereby two base stations are
deployed, the probability of Bob being successful converges
much faster than the probability of Eve being successful.
Indeed, even when the adversary is equipped with NE = 8
antennas, ten antennas at each BS is sufficient to provide
a positive secrecy gap with probability approximate to one
(0.9999). On the other hand, when NA = 8, the eavesdropper
needs at least forty antennas for a 50% chance to get a better
signal than the legitimate receiver (Fig. 2b).
Lastly, for the case when NA → ∞, it is evident from
Eq. (11) and (12) that the employment of an infinite number
of antennas NA increases Bob’s SNR asymptotically. As
such, for a fixed number of antennas at Eve, we have that




P (SG > 0) = 1. (21)
The above equation implies that the employment of a single
base station and conventional wiretap coding are sufficient to
secure the communication from Alice to Bob when NA is
asymptotically large.
IV. BASE STATION ALLOCATION AND NUMERICAL
RESULTS
A. Secret Splitting Vs Conventional Wiretap Coding
With the probability of positive secrecy gap being an
increasing function of both NA and M , the question arising
is whether giving Alice more antennas is more beneficial
than employing more BSs for secrecy purposes or vice versa.
Besides, when taking into account the transmission rate, a
small M is preferred given that Bob is a single antenna device
and receives the secret splits successively. Two strategies are
considered:
Strg 1: Alice employs M > 1 base stations each equipped
with K antennas. (M > 1 & NA = K).
Strg 2: Alice employs one base station with MK antennas.
(M = 1 & NA = MK).
The first strategy is referred to as the M -secret splitting
strategy, whereas the trivial case (M = 1) is the case of
conventional wiretap coding. The total number of antennas
is MK for both cases to facilitate comparison. Whether the
first strategy outperforms the second in terms of providing
a positive secrecy gap depends on the channel statistics of
the two receivers. It can be shown that conventional wiretap
coding outperforms secret splitting when the eavesdropper
channel or location is known at Alice.
When the wiretap CSI is known at Alice, M -secret splitting
is unnecessary: Alice can simply transmit with the BS that
maximises the ratio γBi/γEi > 1. Even when only the location
of the eavesdropper is known, the trivial case whereby Alice
transmits with the BS minimises the ratio of the distances
d(Ai, B)/d(Ai, E) maximises the probability of a positive
secrecy gap. However, in a practical scenario the location of a
passive eavesdropper is unknown. It will be shown, that in the
case of a passive eavesdropper, M -secret splitting is a better
strategy in terms of secrecy.
With no information on the eavesdropper’s location, E,
the comparison between the two strategies will be made by
evaluating the average performance, P0, over a set of possible
locations for Eve, E :
P0 := E[P (SGsplit > 0|E ∈ E)]. (22)
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: The average performance:
P0 = E[P (SGsplit > 0|E ∈ E)] against the angle difference of
the two BSs |θA1 − θA2 | (3b). The set of possible locations
for Eve is E = C(B, 1.5ρA1) (3a).
The set of possible locations, E , is taken to be either the
interior of a square or the interior of a circle:
• E = C(B, ρE): the interior of the circle of radius ρE and
centre B, i.e., Bob’s location, or
• E = S(B, ρE): the interior of some square of base 2ρE
and centre B.
Due to the infinite cardinality of the sets and the complexity
of the formulae, the evaluation of the performance P0 will be
derived empirically by sampling the eavesdropper’s location
in E uniformly. Note that in this paper Eve and Bob lie on
the same plane. The simulation methods have been validated
a priori by considering discrete sets of small cardinality for
which the theoretical results matched the empirical ones.
The BS allocation plays a critical role in the performance.
The following theorem considers the extreme case when all
BSs are placed at the same location.
Theorem 5. When the secret splits are sent from the same
location, conventional wiretap coding and secret splitting
perform the same in terms of increasing P0.
Remark 5.1. Theorem 5 justifies the reason for employing
multiple BSs rather than grouping the antennas within a single
BS; Splitting a message between groups of antennas at a
single BS is equivalent in performance to conventional wiretap
coding, so this scheme uses spatially separated BSs.
With Bob being at the origin, B(0, 0), of a polar coordi-
nate system, let Ai be placed at Ai(ρAi , θAi). As Fig. 3b
demonstrates, the average performance under 2-secret splitting
increases as the difference of the angles of the two base
stations approaches π. The angle difference of |θA2−θA1 | = π
will be referred to as the optimal angle-difference. Observe
that a near-optimal angle-difference (e.g., π ± π/4) achieves
performances near to the maximum. This is an encouraging
result for real-life communication systems when considering
that the angle difference will most likely differ from the
optimal.
The performance of conventional wiretap coding can also
be extracted from the graph in Fig. 3b; According to Th.
5, one simply needs to look at the corresponding value of
|θA1 − θA2 | = 0 for the case when ρA1 = 1, ρA2 = 1. For
example, when E = C(0, 1.5) and NE = 1 Strategy 1 achieves
a positive secrecy gap with probability P0 = 0.73. As for the
second strategy, even when A2 is placed at double the distance
from Bob than A1 (ρA2 = 2), the probability, P0, increases
remarkably (up to 27%).
Table I lists five examples for a set of different parameters.
The average performance has been evaluated over the circle
C(B, 1.5ρA1). For the case when M = 2, the second base
station is placed at distance ρA2 = ρA1 = 1 from Bob
as illustrated in Fig. 3a. Column ‘optimal’ lists the average
performance, P0, when the BSs are placed diametrically
opposed to Bob (|θA2−θA1 | = π). The average performance is
also recorded for the case when the angle-difference differs far
from the optimal: |θA1 − θA2 | = 2π/3. For all cases, Strategy
1 is the best strategy in terms of providing a positive secrecy
gap.
TABLE I:
Average Performance P0 = P (SGsplit > 0|E ∈ E) under
Strategy 1 and Strategy 2. Bob is at the origin B(0, 0) and
the set of possible locations for Eve is the circle C(B, 1.5).
Two cases are considered in Strategy 1: (a) the two BSs are at
A1(1, 0) and A2(1, π) forming an ‘optimal’ angle with Bob
(b) the two BSs are at A1(1, 0) and A2(1, 3π/4) forming a
‘non-optimal’ angle.
Strategy 1: Strategy 2:
2 BSs with K antennas each 1 BS with
P0 optimal non-optimal 2K antennas
K = 2, NE = 1 0.981 0.992 0.815
K = 3, NE = 1 0.999 0.995 0.846
K = 32, NE = 1 1.00 1.00 0.950
K = 2, NE = 64 0.098 0.097 0.084
K = 32,NE = 64 0.950 0.894 0.595
Observe that even when Eve is a single-antenna node,
beamforming with 2K = 64 antennas at one BS does not
guarantee a positive secrecy gap (P0 = .95). On the other
hand, distributing the antennas in two BSs (case K = 32,
NE = 1) results in a positive secrecy gap with probability one.
Simulations suggest that when the eavesdropper is a single-
antenna node, two BSs with just three antennas each can
almost certainly provide the legitimate pair with a positive
secrecy gap (case K = 2, NE = 1). Lastly, both strategies
perform poorly when the adversary has a much bigger number
of antennas than Alice (case K = 2, NE = 64).
B. M = 2 Vs M > 2
It has been shown that security can significantly be en-
hanced by distributing the antennas at two base stations when
there is no knowledge of the wiretap channel. This section
examines the case of multiple BSs (M ≥ 2) and compares
non-trivial secret-splitting strategies when the total number of
antennas is fixed for the two cases. I.e., having established
Fig. 4: Average performance:
P0 = E[P (SGsplit > 0|E ∈ E)] against the number of BSs (M)
when the total number of antennas is fixed to
∑
NA = 64.
The set of the eavesdropper’s possible locations is the square
S(B, 1.5) and for every M , the BSs are placed optimally at
distance one from Bob.
Fig. 5: A closer look at the data of Fig. 4 for the cases where
M ≤ 3 BSs are employed. The performance, P0, is plotted
against the number of antennas at the eavesdropper.
that under an appropriate base station allocation secret splitting
outperforms conventional wiretap coding for secrecy, we now
examine what is the optimal number of BSs. For example,
Alice is concerned whether three BSs with two antennas each
perform better than two BSs with three antennas each. The
multiple BSs are placed in a way such that they form a regular
polygon with Bob being at the centre:
Ai is placed at (1, 2π(i− 1)/M). (23)
For example, when M = 3, the BSs form an equilateral
triangle. Assuming that the BSs can have a minimum distance
of one from Bob, the above BS allocation is the optimal in
terms of increasing the probability P0. Indeed, by separating
the BSs as far as possible form each other whilst the distance
between each of them and Bob is kept the minimum, there is
always one BS for which Bob is closer to than Eve. As such,
the probability of Eve ‘missing’ a secret split is maximised.
As seen in Figure 4, when the total number of antennas is
fixed, the performance is maximised for M = 2 and degrades
gradually with M > 2. In particular, the more antennas
employed at Eve, the faster the performance of P0 degrades
with M > 2. Therefore, if there exist two BSs that are placed
diametrically opposed to Bob, transmitting two splits with two
Fig. 6: The curved lines indicate the performance P0 against
the optimal and sub-optimal angle-difference between two
BSs. The vertical lines correspond to the case when M = 3 are
placed optimally. The highlighted segments indicate the angle-
differences for which 2 BSs outperform the employment of 3
BSs.
3-antenna BSs is a better strategy than transmitting three splits
with three 2-antenna BSs.
Extracting the data from Fig. 4, for M ≤ 3, Fig. 5
is plotted. Since the difference in the performance of the
cases M = 2 and M = 3 is very small, transmitting with
three splits may be more beneficial if the two BSs are not
placed optimally. Simulations suggest that M = 2 is the
optimal number of BSs as long as the angle-difference doesn’t
differ more than π/5 from the optimal angle-difference (π).
The simulations were run for a different set of parameters:
∑
NA = 6, 12, 60, 120 and NE ∈ [10
∑
NA]. Figure 6 is
an example of the performance for the two cases M = 2
Vs M = 3 when
∑
NA = 6. The curved lines indicate the
performance of the case M = 2 against the angle-difference
whilst the vertical lines indicate the maximum performance
for the case M = 3. In most cases, the case M = 2 performs
better even when 3π/4 < |θA2 − θA1 | < 5π/4.
V. CONCLUSION
In Section II the secret splitting scheme has been explained.
The definitions displayed are generic and can be applied in
any channel model. Section III has examined our scheme for
the case of Rayleigh channels and transmit beamforming. The
formulae derived allowed a theoretical analysis and facilitated
the numerical results in the following section. Section IV has
also demonstrated the importance of base station allocation
and has made comparisons between our scheme and conven-
tional wiretap coding in terms of increasing the probability
of secrecy gap. It has been shown that under a constraint
of the total number of antennas:
∑
NA ≤ K, it is more
beneficial to distribute K antennas among a small number of
BSs with two being the optimal number of BSs as long as the
legitimate receiver is in between the two BSs. For example,
when the legitimate receiver moves along streets or railways,
the proposed scheme could find a good fit.
It has been shown that secret splitting can significantly
decrease the areas at which the eavesdropper has an advan-
tage over the intended receiver. However, a relatively small
secrecy gap may result in impractically long codewords and
transmission rates that do not meet the Quality-of-Service
requirements. In future work, rates for wiretap coding under
secret splitting can be fixed. In scenarios where a target
equivocation rate is not met, the information leakage towards
the eavesdropper should be quantified. Moreover, the case
of a multiple-antenna receiver is also an interesting case;
Allowing Bob to receive the secret splits simultaneously will
significantly increase the transmission rate whilst benefiting
from the security enhancement of secret splitting.
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